| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_tci() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_tci() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8da482 len:32 put:14 head:ffff88807a1d5800 data:ffff88807a1d5810 tail:0x14 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5880 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 9e 6c 26 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 3a 5a 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003baf5b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 8565c1eec37aa000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802616fb50 R08: ffffffff817f0a4c R09: 1ffff92000775e50
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000775e51 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807a1d5800 R14: ffff88807a1d5810 R15: 0000000000000014
FS: 00007fa03261f6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd65753000 CR3: 0000000031720000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_tci+0x272/0x550 net/packet/af_packet.c:565
packet_recvmsg+0x13c9/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3616
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1066
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2814
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2856 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2951
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3025 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3048 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3041
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS: 00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd()
1. The size of the response packet is not validated.
2. The response buffer is not freed.
Resolve these issues by switching to iwl_mvm_send_cmd_status(),
which handles both size validation and frees the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_init_flow()
There are code paths from which the function is called without holding
the RCU read lock, resulting in a suspicious RCU usage warning [1].
Fix by using l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index() which will acquire
the RCU read lock before calling
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu().
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/361:
#0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
dev_get_by_index_rcu+0x1d3/0x210
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu+0x2b/0xf0
ip_tunnel_bind_dev+0x72f/0xa00
ip_tunnel_newlink+0x368/0x7a0
ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
__rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
__sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_payload: sanitize offset and length before calling skb_checksum()
If access to offset + length is larger than the skbuff length, then
skb_checksum() triggers BUG_ON().
skb_checksum() internally subtracts the length parameter while iterating
over skbuff, BUG_ON(len) at the end of it checks that the expected
length to be included in the checksum calculation is fully consumed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Add rough attr alloc_size check |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: dp83869: fix memory corruption when enabling fiber
When configuring the fiber port, the DP83869 PHY driver incorrectly
calls linkmode_set_bit() with a bit mask (1 << 10) rather than a bit
number (10). This corrupts some other memory location -- in case of
arm64 the priv pointer in the same structure.
Since the advertising flags are updated from supported at the end of the
function the incorrect line isn't needed at all and can be removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix wild-memory-access in proto_unregister
There's issue as follows:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...108-0xdead...10f]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2805 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W
RIP: 0010:proto_unregister+0xee/0x400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__do_sys_delete_module+0x318/0x580
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
As bnep_init() ignore bnep_sock_init()'s return value, and bnep_sock_init()
will cleanup all resource. Then when remove bnep module will call
bnep_sock_cleanup() to cleanup sock's resource.
To solve above issue just return bnep_sock_init()'s return value in
bnep_exit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: validate new SA's prefixlen using SA family when sel.family is unset
This expands the validation introduced in commit 07bf7908950a ("xfrm:
Validate address prefix lengths in the xfrm selector.")
syzbot created an SA with
usersa.sel.family = AF_UNSPEC
usersa.sel.prefixlen_s = 128
usersa.family = AF_INET
Because of the AF_UNSPEC selector, verify_newsa_info doesn't put
limits on prefixlen_{s,d}. But then copy_from_user_state sets
x->sel.family to usersa.family (AF_INET). Do the same conversion in
verify_newsa_info before validating prefixlen_{s,d}, since that's how
prefixlen is going to be used later on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vboxvideo: Replace fake VLA at end of vbva_mouse_pointer_shape with real VLA
Replace the fake VLA at end of the vbva_mouse_pointer_shape shape with
a real VLA to fix a "memcpy: detected field-spanning write error" warning:
[ 13.319813] memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16896) of single field "p->data" at drivers/gpu/drm/vboxvideo/hgsmi_base.c:154 (size 4)
[ 13.319841] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1105 at drivers/gpu/drm/vboxvideo/hgsmi_base.c:154 hgsmi_update_pointer_shape+0x192/0x1c0 [vboxvideo]
[ 13.320038] Call Trace:
[ 13.320173] hgsmi_update_pointer_shape [vboxvideo]
[ 13.320184] vbox_cursor_atomic_update [vboxvideo]
Note as mentioned in the added comment it seems the original length
calculation for the allocated and send hgsmi buffer is 4 bytes too large.
Changing this is not the goal of this patch, so this behavior is kept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Improve handling of timed out WRs of mad agent
Current timeout handler of mad agent acquires/releases mad_agent_priv
lock for every timed out WRs. This causes heavy locking contention
when higher no. of WRs are to be handled inside timeout handler.
This leads to softlockup with below trace in some use cases where
rdma-cm path is used to establish connection between peer nodes
Trace:
-----
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u128:3:19767]
CPU: 4 PID: 19767 Comm: kworker/u128:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE
------- --- 5.14.0-427.13.1.el9_4.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/01YM03, BIOS 2.4.8 11/26/2019
Workqueue: ib_mad1 timeout_sends [ib_core]
RIP: 0010:__do_softirq+0x78/0x2ac
RSP: 0018:ffffb253449e4f98 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001f
RDX: 000000000000001d RSI: 000000003d1879ab RDI: fff363b66fd3a86b
RBP: ffffb253604cbcd8 R08: 0000009065635f3b R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffffb253449e4ff8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8caa1fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd9ec9db900 CR3: 0000000891934006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
? watchdog_timer_fn+0x1b2/0x210
? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x127/0x2c0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x210
? __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5c/0x110
? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x37/0x90
? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
? __do_softirq+0x78/0x2ac
? __do_softirq+0x60/0x2ac
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
sysvec_call_function_single+0x72/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x16/0x20
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x14/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffffb253604cbd88 EFLAGS: 00000247
RAX: 000000000001960d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff8cad2a064800
RDX: 000000008020001b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8cad5d39f66c
RBP: ffff8cad5d39f600 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8caa443e0c00 R11: ffffb253604cbcd8 R12: ffff8cacb8682538
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffffb253604cbd90 R15: ffff8cad5d39f66c
cm_process_send_error+0x122/0x1d0 [ib_cm]
timeout_sends+0x1dd/0x270 [ib_core]
process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK>
Simplified timeout handler by creating local list of timed out WRs
and invoke send handler post creating the list. The new method acquires/
releases lock once to fetch the list and hence helps to reduce locking
contetiong when processing higher no. of WRs |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igb: Do not bring the device up after non-fatal error
Commit 004d25060c78 ("igb: Fix igb_down hung on surprise removal")
changed igb_io_error_detected() to ignore non-fatal pcie errors in order
to avoid hung task that can happen when igb_down() is called multiple
times. This caused an issue when processing transient non-fatal errors.
igb_io_resume(), which is called after igb_io_error_detected(), assumes
that device is brought down by igb_io_error_detected() if the interface
is up. This resulted in panic with stacktrace below.
[ T3256] igb 0000:09:00.0 haeth0: igb: haeth0 NIC Link is Down
[ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) error received: 0000:09:00.0
[ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fatal), type=Transaction Layer, (Requester ID)
[ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: device [8086:1537] error status/mask=00004000/00000000
[ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: [14] CmpltTO [ 200.105524,009][ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: AER: TLP Header: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast error_detected message
[ T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: Non-correctable non-fatal error reported.
[ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast mmio_enabled message
[ T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast resume message
[ T292] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ T292] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6539!
[ T292] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ T292] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[ T292] Call Trace:
[ T292] <TASK>
[ T292] ? die+0x33/0x90
[ T292] ? do_trap+0xdc/0x110
[ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[ T292] ? do_error_trap+0x70/0xb0
[ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[ T292] ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
[ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[ T292] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ T292] ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[ T292] igb_up+0x41/0x150
[ T292] igb_io_resume+0x25/0x70
[ T292] report_resume+0x54/0x70
[ T292] ? report_frozen_detected+0x20/0x20
[ T292] pci_walk_bus+0x6c/0x90
[ T292] ? aer_print_port_info+0xa0/0xa0
[ T292] pcie_do_recovery+0x22f/0x380
[ T292] aer_process_err_devices+0x110/0x160
[ T292] aer_isr+0x1c1/0x1e0
[ T292] ? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10
[ T292] irq_thread_fn+0x1a/0x60
[ T292] irq_thread+0xe3/0x1a0
[ T292] ? irq_set_affinity_notifier+0x120/0x120
[ T292] ? irq_affinity_notify+0x100/0x100
[ T292] kthread+0xe2/0x110
[ T292] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ T292] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ T292] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ T292] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ T292] </TASK>
To fix this issue igb_io_resume() checks if the interface is running and
the device is not down this means igb_io_error_detected() did not bring
the device down and there is no need to bring it up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writing
The dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocks
and copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signal
handling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and added
on inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceed
the inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:
dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1
dax_iomap_rw
iomap_iter // round 1
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data
iomap_iter // round 2
iomap_iter_advance
iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter
fatal_signal_pending
done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M
ext4_handle_inode_extension
ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2M
fsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?
Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smaller
than expected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: don't WARN for racy path_noexec check
Both i_mode and noexec checks wrapped in WARN_ON stem from an artifact
of the previous implementation. They used to legitimately check for the
condition, but that got moved up in two commits:
633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier")
0fd338b2d2cd ("exec: move path_noexec() check earlier")
Instead of being removed said checks are WARN_ON'ed instead, which
has some debug value.
However, the spurious path_noexec check is racy, resulting in
unwarranted warnings should someone race with setting the noexec flag.
One can note there is more to perm-checking whether execve is allowed
and none of the conditions are guaranteed to still hold after they were
tested for.
Additionally this does not validate whether the code path did any perm
checking to begin with -- it will pass if the inode happens to be
regular.
Keep the redundant path_noexec() check even though it's mindless
nonsense checking for guarantee that isn't given so drop the WARN.
Reword the commentary and do small tidy ups while here.
[brauner: keep redundant path_noexec() check] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
r8169: add tally counter fields added with RTL8125
RTL8125 added fields to the tally counter, what may result in the chip
dma'ing these new fields to unallocated memory. Therefore make sure
that the allocated memory area is big enough to hold all of the
tally counter values, even if we use only parts of it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: Fix memcpy() field-spanning write warning in mwifiex_cmd_802_11_scan_ext()
Replace one-element array with a flexible-array member in
`struct host_cmd_ds_802_11_scan_ext`.
With this, fix the following warning:
elo 16 17:51:58 surfacebook kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
elo 16 17:51:58 surfacebook kernel: memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 243) of single field "ext_scan->tlv_buffer" at drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c:2239 (size 1)
elo 16 17:51:58 surfacebook kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 498 at drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c:2239 mwifiex_cmd_802_11_scan_ext+0x83/0x90 [mwifiex] |
| A type check was missing when handling fonts in PDF.js, which would allow arbitrary JavaScript execution in the PDF.js context. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 126, Firefox ESR < 115.11, and Thunderbird < 115.11. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: prevent nf_skb_duplicated corruption
syzbot found that nf_dup_ipv4() or nf_dup_ipv6() could write
per-cpu variable nf_skb_duplicated in an unsafe way [1].
Disabling preemption as hinted by the splat is not enough,
we have to disable soft interrupts as well.
[1]
BUG: using __this_cpu_write() in preemptible [00000000] code: syz.4.282/6316
caller is nf_dup_ipv4+0x651/0x8f0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv4.c:87
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6316 Comm: syz.4.282 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-00104-g7052622fccb1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
check_preemption_disabled+0x10e/0x120 lib/smp_processor_id.c:49
nf_dup_ipv4+0x651/0x8f0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv4.c:87
nft_dup_ipv4_eval+0x1db/0x300 net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_dup_ipv4.c:30
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x4ad/0x1da0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x202/0x320 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook+0x2c4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:269
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
ip_output+0x185/0x230 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline]
ip_send_skb+0x74/0x100 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1495
udp_send_skb+0xacf/0x1650 net/ipv4/udp.c:981
udp_sendmsg+0x1c21/0x2a60 net/ipv4/udp.c:1269
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f4ce4f7def9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f4ce5d4a038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ce5135f80 RCX: 00007f4ce4f7def9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020005d40 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f4ce4ff0b76 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f4ce5135f80 R15: 00007ffd4cbc6d68
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init()
One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming
skb->len is bigger than hdr_len.
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers,
it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes.
It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet,
total length of 80 bytes.
- 20 bytes of IPv4 header
- 60 bytes TCP header
- a small gso_size like 8
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal
GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload,
bigger than gso_size.
We need to make detect this case to not underflow
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: set sk_state back to CLOSED if autobind fails in sctp_listen_start
In sctp_listen_start() invoked by sctp_inet_listen(), it should set the
sk_state back to CLOSED if sctp_autobind() fails due to whatever reason.
Otherwise, next time when calling sctp_inet_listen(), if sctp_sk(sk)->reuse
is already set via setsockopt(SCTP_REUSE_PORT), sctp_sk(sk)->bind_hash will
be dereferenced as sk_state is LISTENING, which causes a crash as bind_hash
is NULL.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:sctp_inet_listen+0x7f0/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8617
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1883 [inline]
__sys_listen+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894
__do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1902 [inline] |
