| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()
syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]
Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]
nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355
nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(nr_node_list_lock);
lock(&nr_node->node_lock);
lock(nr_node_list_lock);
lock(&nr_node->node_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:
#0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8f70
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix overwriting ct original tuple for ICMPv6
OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE has 3 main attributes:
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY - Packet metadata in a netlink format.
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET - Binary packet content.
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS - Actions to execute on the packet.
OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY is parsed first to populate sw_flow_key structure
with the metadata like conntrack state, input port, recirculation id,
etc. Then the packet itself gets parsed to populate the rest of the
keys from the packet headers.
Whenever the packet parsing code starts parsing the ICMPv6 header, it
first zeroes out fields in the key corresponding to Neighbor Discovery
information even if it is not an ND packet.
It is an 'ipv6.nd' field. However, the 'ipv6' is a union that shares
the space between 'nd' and 'ct_orig' that holds the original tuple
conntrack metadata parsed from the OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY.
ND packets should not normally have conntrack state, so it's fine to
share the space, but normal ICMPv6 Echo packets or maybe other types of
ICMPv6 can have the state attached and it should not be overwritten.
The issue results in all but the last 4 bytes of the destination
address being wiped from the original conntrack tuple leading to
incorrect packet matching and potentially executing wrong actions
in case this packet recirculates within the datapath or goes back
to userspace.
ND fields should not be accessed in non-ND packets, so not clearing
them should be fine. Executing memset() only for actual ND packets to
avoid the issue.
Initializing the whole thing before parsing is needed because ND packet
may not contain all the options.
The issue only affects the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE path and doesn't
affect packets entering OVS datapath from network interfaces, because
in this case CT metadata is populated from skb after the packet is
already parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: acquire rcu_read_lock() in instance_destroy_rcu()
syzbot reported that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() :
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Not tainted
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:263 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/13427:
#0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa86/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471
#1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
#1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:405 [inline]
#1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: instance_destroy_rcu+0x30/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 13427 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712
nf_reinject net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:323 [inline]
nfqnl_reinject+0x6ec/0x1120 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:397
nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:410 [inline]
instance_destroy_rcu+0x1ae/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2196 [inline]
rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471
handle_softirqs+0x2d6/0x990 kernel/softirq.c:554
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043
</IRQ>
<TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid: remove I2C_HID_READ_PENDING flag to prevent lock-up
The flag I2C_HID_READ_PENDING is used to serialize I2C operations.
However, this is not necessary, because I2C core already has its own
locking for that.
More importantly, this flag can cause a lock-up: if the flag is set in
i2c_hid_xfer() and an interrupt happens, the interrupt handler
(i2c_hid_irq) will check this flag and return immediately without doing
anything, then the interrupt handler will be invoked again in an
infinite loop.
Since interrupt handler is an RT task, it takes over the CPU and the
flag-clearing task never gets scheduled, thus we have a lock-up.
Delete this unnecessary flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma: xilinx_dpdma: Fix locking
There are several places where either chan->lock or chan->vchan.lock was
not held. Add appropriate locking. This fixes lockdep warnings like
[ 31.077578] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 31.077831] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 40 at drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c:834 xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0
[ 31.077953] Modules linked in:
[ 31.078019] CPU: 2 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u12:1 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #98
[ 31.078102] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[ 31.078169] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 31.078272] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 31.078377] pc : xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0
[ 31.078473] lr : xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x270/0x5e0
[ 31.078550] sp : ffffffc083bb2e10
[ 31.078590] x29: ffffffc083bb2e10 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff880165a168
[ 31.078754] x26: ffffff880164e920 x25: ffffff880164eab8 x24: ffffff880164d480
[ 31.078920] x23: ffffff880165a148 x22: ffffff880164e988 x21: 0000000000000000
[ 31.079132] x20: ffffffc082aa3000 x19: ffffff880164e880 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 31.079295] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 31.079453] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffff8802263dc0 x12: 0000000000000001
[ 31.079613] x11: 0001ffc083bb2e34 x10: 0001ff880164e98f x9 : 0001ffc082aa3def
[ 31.079824] x8 : 0001ffc082aa3dec x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000516
[ 31.079982] x5 : ffffffc7f8d43000 x4 : ffffff88003c9c40 x3 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 31.080147] x2 : ffffffc7f8d43000 x1 : 00000000000000c0 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 31.080307] Call trace:
[ 31.080340] xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0
[ 31.080518] xilinx_dpdma_issue_pending+0x11c/0x120
[ 31.080595] zynqmp_disp_layer_update+0x180/0x3ac
[ 31.080712] zynqmp_dpsub_plane_atomic_update+0x11c/0x21c
[ 31.080825] drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x20c/0x684
[ 31.080951] drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x5c/0xb0
[ 31.081139] commit_tail+0x234/0x294
[ 31.081246] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1f8/0x210
[ 31.081363] drm_atomic_commit+0x100/0x140
[ 31.081477] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x318/0x384
[ 31.081634] drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x8c/0x24c
[ 31.081725] drm_client_modeset_commit+0x34/0x5c
[ 31.081812] __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x104/0x168
[ 31.081899] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x50/0x70
[ 31.081971] fbcon_init+0x538/0xc48
[ 31.082047] visual_init+0x16c/0x23c
[ 31.082207] do_bind_con_driver.isra.0+0x2d0/0x634
[ 31.082320] do_take_over_console+0x24c/0x33c
[ 31.082429] do_fbcon_takeover+0xbc/0x1b0
[ 31.082503] fbcon_fb_registered+0x2d0/0x34c
[ 31.082663] register_framebuffer+0x27c/0x38c
[ 31.082767] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x5c0/0x91c
[ 31.082939] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x50/0x74
[ 31.083012] drm_fbdev_dma_client_hotplug+0xb8/0x108
[ 31.083115] drm_client_register+0xa0/0xf4
[ 31.083195] drm_fbdev_dma_setup+0xb0/0x1cc
[ 31.083293] zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init+0x45c/0x4e0
[ 31.083431] zynqmp_dpsub_probe+0x444/0x5e0
[ 31.083616] platform_probe+0x8c/0x13c
[ 31.083713] really_probe+0x258/0x59c
[ 31.083793] __driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x224
[ 31.083878] driver_probe_device+0x70/0x1c0
[ 31.083961] __device_attach_driver+0x108/0x1e0
[ 31.084052] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0x100
[ 31.084125] __device_attach+0x100/0x298
[ 31.084207] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 31.084292] bus_probe_device+0xd8/0xdc
[ 31.084368] deferred_probe_work_func+0x11c/0x180
[ 31.084451] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988
[ 31.084643] worker_thread+0x398/0x694
[ 31.084752] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0
[ 31.084848] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 31.084932] irq event stamp: 64549
[ 31.084970] hardirqs last enabled at (64548): [<ffffffc081adf35c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x80/0x90
[ 31.085157]
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem
syzkaller started using corpuses where a BPF tracing program deletes
elements from a sockmap/sockhash map. Because BPF tracing programs can be
invoked from any interrupt context, locks taken during a map_delete_elem
operation must be hardirq-safe. Otherwise a deadlock due to lock inversion
is possible, as reported by lockdep:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&host->lock);
lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&host->lock);
Locks in sockmap are hardirq-unsafe by design. We expects elements to be
deleted from sockmap/sockhash only in task (normal) context with interrupts
enabled, or in softirq context.
Detect when map_delete_elem operation is invoked from a context which is
_not_ hardirq-unsafe, that is interrupts are disabled, and bail out with an
error.
Note that map updates are not affected by this issue. BPF verifier does not
allow updating sockmap/sockhash from a BPF tracing program today. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done().
syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during
netlink socket destruction. [1]
From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then
the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump
for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due
to the fault injection. [0]
12:01:34 executing program 3:
r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0)
sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...)
recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8)
Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call
of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped
receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct()
called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done().
fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it
is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by
nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling
itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page.
To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc().
[0]:
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117)
should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153)
should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733)
kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992)
inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662)
rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029)
netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269)
netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988)
____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801)
___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846)
do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943)
__x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034)
[1]:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb)
stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work
RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570)
Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3
RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358
RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<#DF>
</#DF>
<TASK>
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
...
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401)
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2))
sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224)
__sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235)
sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel
When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when
being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause
various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by
looking for a matching socket. This is performed in
udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue
with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such
cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various
issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list.
We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such
case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path,
the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs
are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit
skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible
depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to
kernel crashes.
One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the
frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled)
skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list,
although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to
do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues.
Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the
lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances)
but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we
could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current
logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure
we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early.
This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets
lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must
be segmented.
[1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408!
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70
__udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm snapshot: fix lockup in dm_exception_table_exit
There was reported lockup when we exit a snapshot with many exceptions.
Fix this by adding "cond_resched" to the loop that frees the exceptions. |
| nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure
The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or
xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory
allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients. The
flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: usbtv: Remove useless locks in usbtv_video_free()
Remove locks calls in usbtv_video_free() because
are useless and may led to a deadlock as reported here:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=166dc872180000
Also remove usbtv_stop() call since it will be called when
unregistering the device.
Before 'c838530d230b' this issue would only be noticed if you
disconnect while streaming and now it is noticeable even when
disconnecting while not streaming.
[hverkuil: fix minor spelling mistake in log message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree during disable_unused
Doug reported [1] the following hung task:
INFO: task swapper/0:1 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:swapper/0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 1 ppid: 0 flags:0x00000008
Call trace:
__switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4
__schedule+0x418/0xb80
schedule+0x5c/0x10c
rpm_resume+0xe0/0x52c
rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98
clk_pm_runtime_get+0x30/0xb0
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x58/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused+0x4c/0xe4
do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x2d8
do_initcall_level+0xa4/0x148
do_initcalls+0x5c/0x9c
do_basic_setup+0x24/0x30
kernel_init_freeable+0xec/0x164
kernel_init+0x28/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
INFO: task kworker/u16:0:9 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u16:0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 9 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000008
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
__switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4
__schedule+0x418/0xb80
schedule+0x5c/0x10c
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x2c/0x48
__mutex_lock+0x238/0x488
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x28
mutex_lock+0x50/0x74
clk_prepare_lock+0x7c/0x9c
clk_core_prepare_lock+0x20/0x44
clk_prepare+0x24/0x30
clk_bulk_prepare+0x40/0xb0
mdss_runtime_resume+0x54/0x1c8
pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
__genpd_runtime_resume+0x68/0x7c
genpd_runtime_resume+0x108/0x1f4
__rpm_callback+0x84/0x144
rpm_callback+0x30/0x88
rpm_resume+0x1f4/0x52c
rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98
__device_attach+0xe0/0x170
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c
device_add+0x644/0x814
mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0xe4/0x170
devm_mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0x28/0x70
ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x1dc/0x2c0
auxiliary_bus_probe+0x4c/0x94
really_probe+0xcc/0x2c8
__driver_probe_device+0xa8/0x130
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xa4/0xcc
bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd8
__device_attach+0xf8/0x170
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c
deferred_probe_work_func+0x9c/0xd8
process_one_work+0x148/0x518
worker_thread+0x138/0x350
kthread+0x138/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The first thread is walking the clk tree and calling
clk_pm_runtime_get() to power on devices required to read the clk
hardware via struct clk_ops::is_enabled(). This thread holds the clk
prepare_lock, and is trying to runtime PM resume a device, when it finds
that the device is in the process of resuming so the thread schedule()s
away waiting for the device to finish resuming before continuing. The
second thread is runtime PM resuming the same device, but the runtime
resume callback is calling clk_prepare(), trying to grab the
prepare_lock waiting on the first thread.
This is a classic ABBA deadlock. To properly fix the deadlock, we must
never runtime PM resume or suspend a device with the clk prepare_lock
held. Actually doing that is near impossible today because the global
prepare_lock would have to be dropped in the middle of the tree, the
device runtime PM resumed/suspended, and then the prepare_lock grabbed
again to ensure consistency of the clk tree topology. If anything
changes with the clk tree in the meantime, we've lost and will need to
start the operation all over again.
Luckily, most of the time we're simply incrementing or decrementing the
runtime PM count on an active device, so we don't have the chance to
schedule away with the prepare_lock held. Let's fix this immediate
problem that can be
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: Reset queue_priority_hint on parking
Originally, with strict in order execution, we could complete execution
only when the queue was empty. Preempt-to-busy allows replacement of an
active request that may complete before the preemption is processed by
HW. If that happens, the request is retired from the queue, but the
queue_priority_hint remains set, preventing direct submission until
after the next CS interrupt is processed.
This preempt-to-busy race can be triggered by the heartbeat, which will
also act as the power-management barrier and upon completion allow us to
idle the HW. We may process the completion of the heartbeat, and begin
parking the engine before the CS event that restores the
queue_priority_hint, causing us to fail the assertion that it is MIN.
<3>[ 166.210729] __engine_park:283 GEM_BUG_ON(engine->sched_engine->queue_priority_hint != (-((int)(~0U >> 1)) - 1))
<0>[ 166.210781] Dumping ftrace buffer:
<0>[ 166.210795] ---------------------------------
...
<0>[ 167.302811] drm_fdin-1097 2..s1. 165741070us : trace_ports: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: promote { ccid:20 1217:2 prio 0 }
<0>[ 167.302861] drm_fdin-1097 2d.s2. 165741072us : execlists_submission_tasklet: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: preempting last=1217:2, prio=0, hint=2147483646
<0>[ 167.302928] drm_fdin-1097 2d.s2. 165741072us : __i915_request_unsubmit: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: fence 1217:2, current 0
<0>[ 167.302992] drm_fdin-1097 2d.s2. 165741073us : __i915_request_submit: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: fence 3:4660, current 4659
<0>[ 167.303044] drm_fdin-1097 2d.s1. 165741076us : execlists_submission_tasklet: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: context:3 schedule-in, ccid:40
<0>[ 167.303095] drm_fdin-1097 2d.s1. 165741077us : trace_ports: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: submit { ccid:40 3:4660* prio 2147483646 }
<0>[ 167.303159] kworker/-89 11..... 165741139us : i915_request_retire.part.0: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: fence c90:2, current 2
<0>[ 167.303208] kworker/-89 11..... 165741148us : __intel_context_do_unpin: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: context:c90 unpin
<0>[ 167.303272] kworker/-89 11..... 165741159us : i915_request_retire.part.0: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: fence 1217:2, current 2
<0>[ 167.303321] kworker/-89 11..... 165741166us : __intel_context_do_unpin: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: context:1217 unpin
<0>[ 167.303384] kworker/-89 11..... 165741170us : i915_request_retire.part.0: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: fence 3:4660, current 4660
<0>[ 167.303434] kworker/-89 11d..1. 165741172us : __intel_context_retire: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: context:1216 retire runtime: { total:56028ns, avg:56028ns }
<0>[ 167.303484] kworker/-89 11..... 165741198us : __engine_park: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: parked
<0>[ 167.303534] <idle>-0 5d.H3. 165741207us : execlists_irq_handler: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: semaphore yield: 00000040
<0>[ 167.303583] kworker/-89 11..... 165741397us : __intel_context_retire: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: context:1217 retire runtime: { total:325575ns, avg:0ns }
<0>[ 167.303756] kworker/-89 11..... 165741777us : __intel_context_retire: 0000:00:02.0 rcs0: context:c90 retire runtime: { total:0ns, avg:0ns }
<0>[ 167.303806] kworker/-89 11..... 165742017us : __engine_park: __engine_park:283 GEM_BUG_ON(engine->sched_engine->queue_priority_hint != (-((int)(~0U >> 1)) - 1))
<0>[ 167.303811] ---------------------------------
<4>[ 167.304722] ------------[ cut here ]------------
<2>[ 167.304725] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_pm.c:283!
<4>[ 167.304731] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
<4>[ 167.304734] CPU: 11 PID: 89 Comm: kworker/11:1 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-rc2-CI_DRM_14193-gc655e0fd2804+ #1
<4>[ 167.304736] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Rocket Lake Client Platform/RocketLake S UDIMM 6L RVP, BIOS RKLSFWI1.R00.3173.A03.2204210138 04/21/2022
<4>[ 167.304738] Workqueue: i915-unordered retire_work_handler [i915]
<4>[ 16
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: core: Fix deadlock in usb_deauthorize_interface()
Among the attribute file callback routines in
drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c, the interface_authorized_store() function is
the only one which acquires a device lock on an ancestor device: It
calls usb_deauthorize_interface(), which locks the interface's parent
USB device.
The will lead to deadlock if another process already owns that lock
and tries to remove the interface, whether through a configuration
change or because the device has been disconnected. As part of the
removal procedure, device_del() waits for all ongoing sysfs attribute
callbacks to complete. But usb_deauthorize_interface() can't complete
until the device lock has been released, and the lock won't be
released until the removal has finished.
The mechanism provided by sysfs to prevent this kind of deadlock is
to use the sysfs_break_active_protection() function, which tells sysfs
not to wait for the attribute callback.
Reported-and-tested by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path
The commit mutex should not be released during the critical section
between nft_gc_seq_begin() and nft_gc_seq_end(), otherwise, async GC
worker could collect expired objects and get the released commit lock
within the same GC sequence.
nf_tables_module_autoload() temporarily releases the mutex to load
module dependencies, then it goes back to replay the transaction again.
Move it at the end of the abort phase after nft_gc_seq_end() is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ice: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in ice_bridge_setlink()
The function ice_bridge_setlink() may encounter a NULL pointer dereference
if nlmsg_find_attr() returns NULL and br_spec is dereferenced subsequently
in nla_for_each_nested(). To address this issue, add a check to ensure that
br_spec is not NULL before proceeding with the nested attribute iteration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout
While the rhashtable set gc runs asynchronously, a race allows it to
collect elements from anonymous sets with timeouts while it is being
released from the commit path.
Mingi Cho originally reported this issue in a different path in 6.1.x
with a pipapo set with low timeouts which is not possible upstream since
7395dfacfff6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use timestamp to check for set
element timeout").
Fix this by setting on the dead flag for anonymous sets to skip async gc
in this case.
According to 08e4c8c5919f ("netfilter: nf_tables: mark newset as dead on
transaction abort"), Florian plans to accelerate abort path by releasing
objects via workqueue, therefore, this sets on the dead flag for abort
path too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER
The test on so_count in nfsd4_release_lockowner() is nonsense and
harmful. Revert to using check_for_locks(), changing that to not sleep.
First: harmful.
As is documented in the kdoc comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner(), the
test on so_count can transiently return a false positive resulting in a
return of NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD when in fact no locks are held. This is
clearly a protocol violation and with the Linux NFS client it can cause
incorrect behaviour.
If RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is sent while some other thread is still
processing a LOCK request which failed because, at the time that request
was received, the given owner held a conflicting lock, then the nfsd
thread processing that LOCK request can hold a reference (conflock) to
the lock owner that causes nfsd4_release_lockowner() to return an
incorrect error.
The Linux NFS client ignores that NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD error because it
never sends NFS4_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER without first releasing any locks, so
it knows that the error is impossible. It assumes the lock owner was in
fact released so it feels free to use the same lock owner identifier in
some later locking request.
When it does reuse a lock owner identifier for which a previous RELEASE
failed, it will naturally use a lock_seqid of zero. However the server,
which didn't release the lock owner, will expect a larger lock_seqid and
so will respond with NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID.
So clearly it is harmful to allow a false positive, which testing
so_count allows.
The test is nonsense because ... well... it doesn't mean anything.
so_count is the sum of three different counts.
1/ the set of states listed on so_stateids
2/ the set of active vfs locks owned by any of those states
3/ various transient counts such as for conflicting locks.
When it is tested against '2' it is clear that one of these is the
transient reference obtained by find_lockowner_str_locked(). It is not
clear what the other one is expected to be.
In practice, the count is often 2 because there is precisely one state
on so_stateids. If there were more, this would fail.
In my testing I see two circumstances when RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is called.
In one case, CLOSE is called before RELEASE_LOCKOWNER. That results in
all the lock states being removed, and so the lockowner being discarded
(it is removed when there are no more references which usually happens
when the lock state is discarded). When nfsd4_release_lockowner() finds
that the lock owner doesn't exist, it returns success.
The other case shows an so_count of '2' and precisely one state listed
in so_stateid. It appears that the Linux client uses a separate lock
owner for each file resulting in one lock state per lock owner, so this
test on '2' is safe. For another client it might not be safe.
So this patch changes check_for_locks() to use the (newish)
find_any_file_locked() so that it doesn't take a reference on the
nfs4_file and so never calls nfsd_file_put(), and so never sleeps. With
this check is it safe to restore the use of check_for_locks() rather
than testing so_count against the mysterious '2'. |
| linux-pam (aka Linux PAM) before 1.6.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (blocked login process) via mkfifo because the openat call (for protect_dir) lacks O_DIRECTORY. |
| Issue summary: Checking excessively long invalid RSA public keys may take
a long time.
Impact summary: Applications that use the function EVP_PKEY_public_check()
to check RSA public keys may experience long delays. Where the key that
is being checked has been obtained from an untrusted source this may lead
to a Denial of Service.
When function EVP_PKEY_public_check() is called on RSA public keys,
a computation is done to confirm that the RSA modulus, n, is composite.
For valid RSA keys, n is a product of two or more large primes and this
computation completes quickly. However, if n is an overly large prime,
then this computation would take a long time.
An application that calls EVP_PKEY_public_check() and supplies an RSA key
obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of Service
attack.
The function EVP_PKEY_public_check() is not called from other OpenSSL
functions however it is called from the OpenSSL pkey command line
application. For that reason that application is also vulnerable if used
with the '-pubin' and '-check' options on untrusted data.
The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue.
The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are affected by this issue. |
