| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix loop termination condition in gss_free_in_token_pages()
The in_token->pages[] array is not NULL terminated. This results in
the following KASAN splat:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x04a2013400000008-0x04a201340000000f] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT
If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit
the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all
fragments (when enabled) or a single packet.
But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN
specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This
can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are
on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed.
There will just be an endless spam of
batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110)
in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the
timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and
therefore never be able to reduce the table even more.
There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of
BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too
high to fit inside a packet. Such a scenario can therefore happen also with
only a single VLAN + 7 non-purgable addresses - requiring at least 120
bytes.
While this should be handled proactively when:
* interface with too low MTU is added
* VLAN is added
* non-purgeable local mac is added
* MTU of an attached interface is reduced
* fragmentation setting gets disabled (which most likely requires dropping
attached interfaces)
not all of these scenarios can be prevented because batman-adv is only
consuming events without the the possibility to prevent these actions
(non-purgable MAC address added, MTU of an attached interface is reduced).
It is therefore necessary to also make sure that the code is able to handle
also the situations when there were already incompatible system
configuration are present. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in VectifyAI PageIndex up to f50e52975313c6716c02b20a119577a1929decba. Affected by this vulnerability is the function toc_transformer of the file pageindex/page_index.py of the component PDF Table of Contents Handler. The manipulation results in infinite loop. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. This product operates on a rolling release basis, ensuring continuous delivery. Consequently, there are no version details for either affected or updated releases. |
| OpenMcdf is a fully .NET / C# library to manipulate Compound File Binary File Format files, also known as Structured Storage. Prior to version 3.1.3, OpenMcdf does not detect cycles in the directory entry red-black tree of a Compound File Binary (CFB) document. A crafted CFB file with a cycle in the LeftSiblingID / RightSiblingID chain causes Storage.EnumerateEntries() and Storage.OpenStream() to loop indefinitely, consuming the calling thread with no possibility of recovery via try/catch. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: fix a crash if ->get_sset_count() fails
If ds->ops->get_sset_count() fails then it "count" is a negative error
code such as -EOPNOTSUPP. Because "i" is an unsigned int, the negative
error code is type promoted to a very high value and the loop will
corrupt memory until the system crashes.
Fix this by checking for error codes and changing the type of "i" to
just int. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid infinite loops caused by residual data
On the mkdir/mknod path, when mapping logical blocks to physical blocks,
if inserting a new extent into the extent tree fails (in this example,
because the file system disabled the huge file feature when marking the
inode as dirty), ext4_ext_map_blocks() only calls ext4_free_blocks() to
reclaim the physical block without deleting the corresponding data in
the extent tree. This causes subsequent mkdir operations to reference
the previously reclaimed physical block number again, even though this
physical block is already being used by the xattr block. Therefore, a
situation arises where both the directory and xattr are using the same
buffer head block in memory simultaneously.
The above causes ext4_xattr_block_set() to enter an infinite loop about
"inserted" and cannot release the inode lock, ultimately leading to the
143s blocking problem mentioned in [1].
If the metadata is corrupted, then trying to remove some extent space
can do even more harm. Also in case EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE
was passed, remove space wrongly update quota information.
Jan Kara suggests distinguishing between two cases:
1) The error is ENOSPC or EDQUOT - in this case the filesystem is fully
consistent and we must maintain its consistency including all the
accounting. However these errors can happen only early before we've
inserted the extent into the extent tree. So current code works correctly
for this case.
2) Some other error - this means metadata is corrupted. We should strive to
do as few modifications as possible to limit damage. So I'd just skip
freeing of allocated blocks.
[1]
INFO: task syz.0.17:5995 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Call Trace:
inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1073 [inline]
__start_dirop fs/namei.c:2923 [inline]
start_dirop fs/namei.c:2934 [inline] |
| Loop with unreachable exit condition ('infinite loop') in .NET, .NET Framework, Visual Studio allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in the C language. Versions 2.12 and prior contain a denial-of-service vulnerability that affects PJSIP users that consume PJSIP's XML parsing in their apps. Users are advised to update. There are no known workarounds. |
| mutt before 2.3.2 has an infinite loop in data_object_to_stream in crypt-gpgme.c. |
| SANE protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| TLS protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 allows denial of service |
| OpenFlow v5 protocol dissector infinite loops in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| RPKI-Router protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| GNW protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| SMB2 protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| UDS protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| USB HID protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
| DLMS/COSEM protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 |
| pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.3, the `pyasn1` library is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack caused by uncontrolled recursion when decoding ASN.1 data with deeply nested structures. An attacker can supply a crafted payload containing thousands of nested `SEQUENCE` (`0x30`) or `SET` (`0x31`) tags with "Indefinite Length" (`0x80`) markers. This forces the decoder to recursively call itself until the Python interpreter crashes with a `RecursionError` or consumes all available memory (OOM), crashing the host application. This is a distinct vulnerability from CVE-2026-23490 (which addressed integer overflows in OID decoding). The fix for CVE-2026-23490 (`MAX_OID_ARC_CONTINUATION_OCTETS`) does not mitigate this recursion issue. Version 0.6.3 fixes this specific issue. |
| MBIM protocol dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.4 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.14 allows denial of service |
