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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-44309 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Gitsign | 2026-05-15 | 5.3 Medium |
| Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44310 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Gitsign | 2026-05-15 | 5.4 Medium |
| Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0. | ||||
| CVE-2024-51746 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Gitsign | 2026-04-15 | 2.5 Low |
| Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. gitsign may select the wrong Rekor entry to use during online verification when multiple entries are returned by the log. gitsign uses Rekor's search API to fetch entries that apply to a signature being verified. The parameters used for the search are the public key and the payload. The search API returns entries that match either condition rather than both. When gitsign's credential cache is used, there can be multiple entries that use the same ephemeral keypair / signing certificate. As gitsign assumes both conditions are matched by Rekor, there is no additional validation that the entry's hash matches the payload being verified, meaning that the wrong entry can be used to successfully pass verification. Impact is minimal as while gitsign does not match the payload against the entry, it does ensure that the certificate matches. This would need to be exploited during the certificate validity window (10 minutes) by the key holder. | ||||
| CVE-2023-47122 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Gitsign | 2024-11-21 | 4.2 Medium |
| Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available. | ||||
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