Description
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
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Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2020-8591 | TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission. |
References
History
No history.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published:
Updated: 2024-08-04T13:45:33.225Z
Reserved: 2020-08-04T00:00:00.000Z
Link: CVE-2020-16630
No data.
Status : Modified
Published: 2021-09-20T20:15:11.337
Modified: 2024-11-21T05:07:11.853
Link: CVE-2020-16630
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
EUVD