binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels
In 4.13, commit 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space")
fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch,
sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so
the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous
transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size.
Unfortunately, on the "free" side, the accounting of async_free_space
did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of
async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or
less. These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue
has gone undetected for several years.
The fix is to use "buffer_size" (the allocated buffer size) instead of
"size" (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space
during the free operation. These are the same except for this
corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads < 8 bytes.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Mon, 04 Nov 2024 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-11T13:44:45.123Z
Reserved: 2024-02-25T13:45:52.720Z
Link: CVE-2021-46935
Updated: 2024-08-04T05:17:43.010Z
Status : Modified
Published: 2024-02-27T10:15:07.957
Modified: 2024-11-21T06:34:58.220
Link: CVE-2021-46935
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.