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Tracking
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2024-2878 | Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. |
Github GHSA |
GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8 | Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()` |
Tue, 03 Sep 2024 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Quinn Project
Quinn Project quinn |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:quinn_project:quinn:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Quinn Project
Quinn Project quinn |
|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Mon, 02 Sep 2024 17:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. | |
| Title | Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()` | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-670 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2024-09-03T14:04:46.433Z
Reserved: 2024-08-26T18:25:35.444Z
Link: CVE-2024-45311
Updated: 2024-09-03T14:04:29.165Z
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2024-09-02T18:15:37.373
Modified: 2024-09-25T17:03:36.817
Link: CVE-2024-45311
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
EUVD
Github GHSA