can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source
Commit 7fdaf8966aae ("can: ucan: use strscpy() to instead of strncpy()")
unintentionally introduced a one byte out of bound read on strscpy()'s
source argument (which is kind of ironic knowing that strscpy() is meant
to be a more secure alternative :)).
Let's consider below buffers:
dest[len + 1]; /* will be NUL terminated */
src[len]; /* may not be NUL terminated */
When doing:
strncpy(dest, src, len);
dest[len] = '\0';
strncpy() will read up to len bytes from src.
On the other hand:
strscpy(dest, src, len + 1);
will read up to len + 1 bytes from src, that is to say, an out of bound
read of one byte will occur on src if it is not NUL terminated. Note
that the src[len] byte is never copied, but strscpy() still needs to
read it to check whether a truncation occurred or not.
This exact pattern happened in ucan.
The root cause is that the source is not NUL terminated. Instead of
doing a copy in a local buffer, directly NUL terminate it as soon as
usb_control_msg() returns. With this, the local firmware_str[] variable
can be removed.
On top of this do a couple refactors:
- ucan_ctl_payload->raw is only used for the firmware string, so
rename it to ucan_ctl_payload->fw_str and change its type from u8 to
char.
- ucan_device_request_in() is only used to retrieve the firmware
string, so rename it to ucan_get_fw_str() and refactor it to make it
directly handle all the string termination logic.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2025-9600 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source Commit 7fdaf8966aae ("can: ucan: use strscpy() to instead of strncpy()") unintentionally introduced a one byte out of bound read on strscpy()'s source argument (which is kind of ironic knowing that strscpy() is meant to be a more secure alternative :)). Let's consider below buffers: dest[len + 1]; /* will be NUL terminated */ src[len]; /* may not be NUL terminated */ When doing: strncpy(dest, src, len); dest[len] = '\0'; strncpy() will read up to len bytes from src. On the other hand: strscpy(dest, src, len + 1); will read up to len + 1 bytes from src, that is to say, an out of bound read of one byte will occur on src if it is not NUL terminated. Note that the src[len] byte is never copied, but strscpy() still needs to read it to check whether a truncation occurred or not. This exact pattern happened in ucan. The root cause is that the source is not NUL terminated. Instead of doing a copy in a local buffer, directly NUL terminate it as soon as usb_control_msg() returns. With this, the local firmware_str[] variable can be removed. On top of this do a couple refactors: - ucan_ctl_payload->raw is only used for the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_ctl_payload->fw_str and change its type from u8 to char. - ucan_device_request_in() is only used to retrieve the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_get_fw_str() and refactor it to make it directly handle all the string termination logic. |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7605-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7605-2 | Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7606-1 | Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7628-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7764-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7764-2 | Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7765-1 | Linux kernel (NVIDIA) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7766-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7767-1 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7767-2 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7779-1 | Linux kernel (IBM) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7790-1 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7800-1 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7801-1 | Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7802-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7801-2 | Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7809-1 | Linux kernel (Azure, N-Series) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7801-3 | Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities |
Wed, 01 Oct 2025 17:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Sat, 12 Apr 2025 03:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
threat_severity
|
Thu, 10 Apr 2025 16:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Fri, 04 Apr 2025 02:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Thu, 03 Apr 2025 07:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source Commit 7fdaf8966aae ("can: ucan: use strscpy() to instead of strncpy()") unintentionally introduced a one byte out of bound read on strscpy()'s source argument (which is kind of ironic knowing that strscpy() is meant to be a more secure alternative :)). Let's consider below buffers: dest[len + 1]; /* will be NUL terminated */ src[len]; /* may not be NUL terminated */ When doing: strncpy(dest, src, len); dest[len] = '\0'; strncpy() will read up to len bytes from src. On the other hand: strscpy(dest, src, len + 1); will read up to len + 1 bytes from src, that is to say, an out of bound read of one byte will occur on src if it is not NUL terminated. Note that the src[len] byte is never copied, but strscpy() still needs to read it to check whether a truncation occurred or not. This exact pattern happened in ucan. The root cause is that the source is not NUL terminated. Instead of doing a copy in a local buffer, directly NUL terminate it as soon as usb_control_msg() returns. With this, the local firmware_str[] variable can be removed. On top of this do a couple refactors: - ucan_ctl_payload->raw is only used for the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_ctl_payload->fw_str and change its type from u8 to char. - ucan_device_request_in() is only used to retrieve the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_get_fw_str() and refactor it to make it directly handle all the string termination logic. | |
| Title | can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source | |
| References |
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-11T21:10:46.137Z
Reserved: 2024-12-29T08:45:45.802Z
Link: CVE-2025-22003
Updated: 2025-10-01T14:39:31.660Z
Status : Modified
Published: 2025-04-03T08:15:15.840
Modified: 2025-10-01T17:15:41.077
Link: CVE-2025-22003
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
EUVD
Ubuntu USN