Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[]
and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain
the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length
*without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to
buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
[ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50
...
[ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb
[ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]
[ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]
[ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception
of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room
for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer
of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct
definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed
size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer
overrun checking still works when enabled.
Published: 2025-05-08
Score: 5.5 Medium
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

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Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2025-13987 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered: [ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc] [ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei] The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet. Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7594-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7594-2 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7594-3 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-2 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8031-1 Linux kernel (GCP) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-3 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-4 Linux kernel (FIPS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-5 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8031-2 Linux kernel (GCP FIPS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-6 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8031-3 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8052-1 Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-7 Linux kernel (Low Latency NVIDIA) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8028-8 Linux kernel (IBM) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8052-2 Linux kernel (Xilinx) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8074-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8074-2 Linux kernel (Azure FIPS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8126-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
History

Wed, 12 Nov 2025 21:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Weaknesses NVD-CWE-noinfo
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.15:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.15:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.15:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel

Tue, 15 Jul 2025 13:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics epss

{'score': 0.00024}

epss

{'score': 0.00025}


Fri, 09 May 2025 02:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Thu, 08 May 2025 06:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered: [ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc] [ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei] The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet. Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.
Title mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-05-11T21:15:41.996Z

Reserved: 2025-04-16T04:51:23.946Z

Link: CVE-2025-37816

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Analyzed

Published: 2025-05-08T07:15:52.837

Modified: 2025-11-12T21:37:34.917

Link: CVE-2025-37816

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2025-05-08T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2025-37816 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses