Description
### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
Published:
2026-02-12
Score:
6.3 Medium
EPSS:
< 1% Very Low
KEV:
No
Impact:
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion
Action:
Patch
Analysis
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| unaffected |
|
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Confidence | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ljharb | Qs | — |
|
Found an issue or want to improve our Enrichment? You can suggest it directly by opening an issue on our dedicated GitHub repository .
Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
 Github GHSA |
GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883 | qs's arrayLimit bypass in comma parsing allows denial of service |
References
History
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 20:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Qs Project
Qs Project qs |
|
| Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-noinfo | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:qs_project:qs:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Qs Project
Qs Project qs |
Fri, 13 Feb 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-179 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
threat_severity
|
Thu, 12 Feb 2026 15:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Thu, 12 Feb 2026 10:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Ljharb
Ljharb qs |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Ljharb
Ljharb qs |
Thu, 12 Feb 2026 05:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | ### Summary The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284). ### Details When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation. **Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50): ```js if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) { return val.split(','); } if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) { throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.'); } return val; ``` The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p). ### PoC **Test 1 - Basic bypass:** ``` npm install qs ``` ```js const qs = require('qs'); const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5) const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }; try { const result = qs.parse(payload, options); console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful) } catch (e) { console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown } ``` **Configuration:** - `comma: true` - `arrayLimit: 5` - `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26. ### Impact Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion. | |
| Title | qs's arrayLimit bypass in comma parsing allows denial of service | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-20 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: harborist
Published:
Updated: 2026-02-12T17:32:05.953Z
Reserved: 2026-02-12T03:52:09.332Z
Link: CVE-2026-2391
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-02-12T15:00:12.364Z
NVD
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-02-12T05:17:11.187
Modified: 2026-02-24T20:13:51.837
Link: CVE-2026-2391
Redhat
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-04-18T12:45:45Z
Weaknesses