The chunked clause of 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':read_data/2 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex ignores the caller-supplied :length option when reading HTTP/1 chunked request bodies. Instead of capping the accumulated body at the configured limit (e.g. Plug.Parsers' default 8 MB), do_read_chunked_data!/5 buffers every received chunk into an iolist unconditionally and materializes the entire body as a single binary. The function always returns {:ok, body, ...}, so callers cannot interpose a 413 response.
Because Plug.Parsers runs before routing and authentication in the standard Phoenix endpoint, an unauthenticated attacker needs no valid route or credentials. Sending a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked POST request with an arbitrarily large body to any path causes the BEAM process to exhaust available memory and be terminated by the OS OOM killer.
The content-length path in the same function correctly enforces the limit and is not affected.
This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.1.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Wed, 13 May 2026 16:15:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Wed, 13 May 2026 14:15:00 +0000
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| Description | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion. The chunked clause of 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':read_data/2 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex ignores the caller-supplied :length option when reading HTTP/1 chunked request bodies. Instead of capping the accumulated body at the configured limit (e.g. Plug.Parsers' default 8 MB), do_read_chunked_data!/5 buffers every received chunk into an iolist unconditionally and materializes the entire body as a single binary. The function always returns {:ok, body, ...}, so callers cannot interpose a 413 response. Because Plug.Parsers runs before routing and authentication in the standard Phoenix endpoint, an unauthenticated attacker needs no valid route or credentials. Sending a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked POST request with an arbitrarily large body to any path causes the BEAM process to exhaust available memory and be terminated by the OS OOM killer. The content-length path in the same function correctly enforces the limit and is not affected. This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.1. | |
| Title | HTTP/1 chunked body reader ignores length cap in bandit | |
| First Time appeared |
Mtrudel
Mtrudel bandit |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-770 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Mtrudel
Mtrudel bandit |
|
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-13T18:27:30.095Z
Reserved: 2026-04-07T12:28:54.916Z
Link: CVE-2026-39803
Updated: 2026-05-13T14:41:29.954Z
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-05-13T14:17:32.633
Modified: 2026-05-13T16:16:41.540
Link: CVE-2026-39803
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-13T16:45:44Z