Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length
mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command
length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the
flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len
field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a
truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range
check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the
queued command buffer.
Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but
validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to
exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DLA |
DLA-4561-1 | linux-6.1 security update |
Debian DSA |
DSA-6243-1 | linux security update |
Fri, 08 May 2026 14:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-noinfo | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Sat, 02 May 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-130 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Fri, 01 May 2026 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer. Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request. | |
| Title | Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-11T22:16:05.863Z
Reserved: 2026-05-01T14:12:55.975Z
Link: CVE-2026-43017
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-05-01T15:16:45.837
Modified: 2026-05-08T14:13:28.580
Link: CVE-2026-43017
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-08T20:30:16Z
Debian DLA
Debian DSA