netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_choice()
In decode_choice(), the boundary check before get_len() uses the
variable `len`, which is still 0 from its initialization at the top of
the function:
unsigned int type, ext, len = 0;
...
if (ext || (son->attr & OPEN)) {
BYTE_ALIGN(bs);
if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, len, 0)) /* len is 0 here */
return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
len = get_len(bs); /* OOB read */
When the bitstream is exactly consumed (bs->cur == bs->end), the check
nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, 0) evaluates to (bs->cur + 0 > bs->end),
which is false. The subsequent get_len() call then dereferences
*bs->cur++, reading 1 byte past the end of the buffer. If that byte
has bit 7 set, get_len() reads a second byte as well.
This can be triggered remotely by sending a crafted Q.931 SETUP message
with a User-User Information Element containing exactly 2 bytes of
PER-encoded data ({0x08, 0x00}) to port 1720 through a firewall with
the nf_conntrack_h323 helper active. The decoder fully consumes the
PER buffer before reaching this code path, resulting in a 1-2 byte
heap-buffer-overflow read confirmed by AddressSanitizer.
Fix this by checking for 2 bytes (the maximum that get_len() may read)
instead of the uninitialized `len`. This matches the pattern used at
every other get_len() call site in the same file, where the caller
checks for 2 bytes of available data before calling get_len().
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
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Tue, 12 May 2026 19:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:-:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Fri, 08 May 2026 13:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Thu, 07 May 2026 03:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 |
Thu, 07 May 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-131 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Wed, 06 May 2026 16:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 |
Wed, 06 May 2026 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_choice() In decode_choice(), the boundary check before get_len() uses the variable `len`, which is still 0 from its initialization at the top of the function: unsigned int type, ext, len = 0; ... if (ext || (son->attr & OPEN)) { BYTE_ALIGN(bs); if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, len, 0)) /* len is 0 here */ return H323_ERROR_BOUND; len = get_len(bs); /* OOB read */ When the bitstream is exactly consumed (bs->cur == bs->end), the check nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, 0) evaluates to (bs->cur + 0 > bs->end), which is false. The subsequent get_len() call then dereferences *bs->cur++, reading 1 byte past the end of the buffer. If that byte has bit 7 set, get_len() reads a second byte as well. This can be triggered remotely by sending a crafted Q.931 SETUP message with a User-User Information Element containing exactly 2 bytes of PER-encoded data ({0x08, 0x00}) to port 1720 through a firewall with the nf_conntrack_h323 helper active. The decoder fully consumes the PER buffer before reaching this code path, resulting in a 1-2 byte heap-buffer-overflow read confirmed by AddressSanitizer. Fix this by checking for 2 bytes (the maximum that get_len() may read) instead of the uninitialized `len`. This matches the pattern used at every other get_len() call site in the same file, where the caller checks for 2 bytes of available data before calling get_len(). | |
| Title | netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_choice() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-11T22:20:34.788Z
Reserved: 2026-05-01T14:12:55.995Z
Link: CVE-2026-43233
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-05-06T12:16:43.417
Modified: 2026-05-12T19:03:56.650
Link: CVE-2026-43233
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-12T21:45:05Z